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Abstract
Countries rich in natural resources do not all
experience the resource curse in the same way.
The rentier state logic holds that the main
political–economic impacts of resource
dependence rest on how the state handles
windfall resource rents. I differentiate how
countries experience the resource curse by dis-
aggregating the rentier effect into how govern-
ments generate and distribute resource rents. A
simple typology of variation in rentier state
experiences explains how the overall credibil-
ity of intertemporal commitment and degree of
political inclusiveness in a country determine
its distinct experience of the resource curse.
Four brief country cases—comparing the
micro political economy of natural resource
governance in Laos, Papua New Guinea,
Mongolia, and Timor-Leste—illustrate how
intertemporal credibility and political inclu-
siveness affect patterns of resource rent genera-
tion and rent distribution. Different countries
experience the resource curse in different
ways, with implications for policy attempts at
mitigation.
Key words: resource curse, rentier state,
natural resource sector governance, inter-
temporal commitment, political inclusiveness
1. Introduction
Many developing countries in East Asia and
the Pacific are endowed with abundant natural
resources, from exhaustible petroleum and
mineral wealth to renewable stores of timber,
agriculture and fisheries. It is a well-known
paradox that, instead of serving as the blessing
they would appear to be, these resources are
often experienced as a political–economic
curse. Natural resources do not, however,
inevitably doom low income countries to a
gloomy fate. Governing elites can make policy
choices and build institutional arrangements in
and around the natural resource sector that
enhance the prospects of reaping the benefits
of their natural abundance. This article offers a
framework for understanding why and how
different developing countries experience the
resource curse in different ways and to varying
degrees and, in turn, offers implications as to
how they can attempt to counteract its effects.
It does so by demonstrating how the manner
in which the state deals with extraordinary
resource rents conditions the extent to which
natural resources really are a curse.
The first section of the article situates this
work with a brief survey of the resource curse
literature, with a particular emphasis on the
concept of the rentier state. In the second
section, I disaggregate the rentier state effect,
emphasising the generation and distribution of
resource rents by governments. A simple
typology of the political economy of resource-
dependent countries explains how the overall
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credibility of intertemporal commitment and
degree of political inclusiveness in a country
determine its distinct experience of the
resource curse. In the third section, I apply this
framework in brief case studies of the micro
political economy of natural resource sector
governance in Laos, Mongolia, Papua New
Guinea and Timor-Leste. I explain differences
in patterns of rent generation and distribution
across the four countries—and, hence, the
variance in how they experience the resource
curse. A concluding section points briefly to
implications for aiding countries in averting
the particular dimensions of the resource curse
that most afflict them.
2. The Rentier State and the Political
Economy of the Resource Curse
The concept of the resource curse serves as
shorthand for conveying the multifaceted eco-
nomic, political and social challenges facing
countries with abundant natural wealth. In the
simplest form of the problem, countries rich in
natural resources have been found to grow
more slowly than their resource-poor com-
parators at similar levels of income (Sachs &
Warner 2001; Frankel 2012). Economists
broadly agree on the technical fixes for how to
offset a decline in the terms of trade, prevent
an over-reliance on resource rents, hedge
revenue flows and public spending plans
against commodity price volatility, and avoid
Dutch disease (Eifert et al. 2002; Humphreys
et al. 2007; Brahmbhatt & Canuto 2010).
The true policy challenge in responding to the
resource curse lies in mastering the politics and
governance dimensions associated with it. Politi-
cal elites are not ignorant of the resource curse and
its consequences, nor of the policies they could
deploy to mitigate these effects. Yet their incen-
tives typically lead them to act in ways that accen-
tuate the resource curse rather than diminish it.As
a result, in comparison with their resource-poor
comparators, countries dependent upon natural
resources have variously been found to experi-
ence more civil conflict (Ross 2004; Humphreys
2005), be more likely to be governed by authori-
tarian regimes (Dunning 2008; Ross 2012) and
suffer social consequences such as poorer educa-
tion outcomes and the marginalization of women
in the workforce (Ross 2012; Spector 2012).
Resource-dependent countries also experience a
series of predatory political–economic distribu-
tive patterns (Tornell & Lane 1999; Auty 2010).
Moreover, the quality of governance in resource-
dependent countries tends to be poorer than it
shouldbegiven their incomelevels, a fact that also
accentuates the other negative effects of resource
wealth (Mehlum et al. 2006; Frankel 2012).
A crucial element linking these various
effects, and determining their severity and the
ways in which they manifest, is how resource-
dependent countries generate and distribute
the windfall rents from their natural resource
endowments.1 The concept of the rentier state
hinges on the fact that natural resources yield a
windfall income stream that resources the state
directly in lieu of taxes (Mahdavy 1970;
Beblawi & Luciani 1987; Ross 1999). These
extraordinary rents reduce the fiscal need for
non-resource taxation—indeed, resource rev-
enues have been shown to displace other forms
of taxation or revenue (Knack 2008). In turn,
by limiting a government’s need for other
forms of revenue generation, natural resource
rents dilute the need for the administrative
apparatus necessary to collect taxes and can
lead to the erosion of institutional capacity-
building (Moore 2004).
Even worse, when political elites have access
to windfall revenue streams in the absence of
institutional checks on their accountability, the
temptation is for them to use the state apparatus
in a predatory fashion, such that it is oriented
towards extracting rent from society and dis-
pensing that rent through patronage networks
(Auty 2010). As a result, political and economic
elites might intensify their battles for control
over the prize of natural resource rents and the
ability to collect and distribute them, in what has
been labelled the ‘voracity effect’ (Tornell &
Lane 1999). Even if resource abundance does
1. The concept of resource dependence is typically mea-
sured as the share of natural resource rents in government
revenues or GDP. Resource dependence is a more analyti-
cally precise concept than resource abundance or richness,
since it captures the extent to which a country’s economy
relies upon extraordinary resource rents and is hence vul-
nerable to the political economy dynamics dealt with here.
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2014258
© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
not cause a deterioration in governance, the
quality of institutions will most likely affect the
quality of economic policy-making and natural
resource management (Robinson et al. 2006). In
particular, governments can be tempted on the
basis of short-term revenue windfalls to make
policy and public-spending decisions with
adverse long-term consequences (Karl 1997).
The rentier state literature thus establishes
that the structural fact of resource depen-
dence affects institutions and policy-making
in predictable patterns. Developing countries
with weak institutions are expected to suffer
the resource curse to its greatest extent. More
recent scholarship has turned to the search for
conditional theories as to why certain coun-
tries experience elements of the resource
curse more deeply than others, especially
emphasising the effects of natural resource
abundance on regime type and conflict
(Dunning 2005; Ron 2005). This article joins
this growing body of ‘second generation’
work on the resource curse, with a particular
focus on explaining how the rentier state
syndrome varies in important ways across
resource-dependent developing countries.
3. Experiencing the Resource Curse:
A Theoretical Framework
Understanding how natural resource rents
flow through the system is crucial in explain-
ing how developing countries experience the
resource curse to different degrees and in
varying ways. Following an analytical frame-
work developed in earlier work (Barma et al.
2012), the rentier state effect can be dis-
aggregated into two rent arenas. Effective rent
generation depends on the regulatory frame-
work in the natural resource sector, how the
state grants licenses or contracts for natural
resource extraction and how the state collects
taxes and royalties from extractive producers.
Effective rent distribution concerns the manner
in which government consumes, saves or
invests its natural resource revenues. Rent
generation and distribution are central in
characterising a government’s management of
the natural resource sector and the channelling
of those resources into sustainable develop-
ment policies—and thus represent two crucial
avenues of variation in how countries experi-
ence core elements of the resource curse. To
capture this variation empirically, I adapt the
World Bank’s ‘natural resource management
value chain’ approach (Mayorga Alba 2009,
Barma et al. 2012) to establish criteria for
evaluating a country’s overall performance in
rent generation and rent distribution (Figure 1).
The rentier state syndrome described above
means that resource dependence comes with
several structural characteristics that make
achieving good outcomes in rent generation
and distribution difficult—large windfall rents
materialising over a short time frame, concen-
trated ownership and decision-making in the
Figure 1 Evaluating Rent Generation and Rent Distribution Outcomes2





• Clear legal and regulatory framework and well-dened insƟtuƟonal responsibiliƟes
for government agencies, providing consistent expectaƟons for sector actors
• Transparent and non-discreƟonary framework for awarding contracts/licenses for
exploraƟon and producƟon rights, including a transparent scal regime






• Channelling of resource revenues into the formal budget process, making them
subject to normal scruƟny and accountability mechanisms
• Judicious allocaƟon of public expenditures—public investment is prioriƟsed and
allocated within a medium-term expenditure framework and aligned with a
naƟonal development strategy
• Strong public nancial management and procurement systems, ensuring public
monies are protected from leakage and rent-seeking, with adequate audit
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sector and privileged access to rents for politi-
cal and economic elites. The resource curse is
mitigated when the political–economic effects
of these structural characteristics can be eased.
Rent generation becomes optimal when a gov-
ernment can make credible intertemporal com-
mitments to both extractive companies and its
citizens; and rent distribution becomes optimal
in inclusive political regimes where govern-
ments have the incentive to use resource rents
to provide public goods that enhance collec-
tive welfare (Barma et al. 2012). Without the
institutional underpinnings for credible inter-
temporal commitments, governments will find
it extremely difficult to negotiate deals with
extractive investors that can bring a consistent
stream of resource rents into the state’s coffers.
And without some form of inclusive decision-
making, it is unlikely that resource rents will
be distributed for collective welfare enhance-
ment. These expectations generate a simple
typology of variation in rentier state experi-
ences (Figure 2).
In short, the overall credibility of inter-
temporal commitment and degree of political
inclusiveness in a country determine its
distinct experience of the resource curse. The
patrimonial and clientelist types of rentier state
are characterised by their limited credibility
of intertemporal commitment. In patrimonial
settings, political authority tends to be indivi-
dualised, often resting on a hierarchy of cro-
nyism, and unrestrained leaders are unlikely to
make credible intertemporal commitments. In
patrimonial rentier states, extractive capacity
is thus low because there is little guarantee of
property rights, constant predation reduces
economic production, and public resources are
typically exploited for private gain. Both rent
generation, which is weak, and rent distribu-
tion will be dominated by a concentrated elite.
In clientelist settings, some degree of political
competition takes place but usually occurs on
the basis of extensive patron–client networks.
Some public goods are provided to mobilise
and reward supporters, but they tend to be par-
ticularist in nature instead of more broadly
enhancing collective welfare. Time horizons
are short because politics are relatively
unpredictable and there are low degrees of
institutionalisation, accountability and con-
straint on power. In clientelist rentier states,
rent generation suffers from these short time
horizons, and both rent generation and distri-
bution are oriented towards providing benefits
to clientelist networks.
The hegemonic and pluralist types of
rentier state have more credible intertem-
poral commitment. In hegemonic settings, an
uncontested, institutionalised political force
2. A more detailed and disaggregated series of good
practice criteria for natural resource management across
the value chain can be found in Mayorga Alba (2009).
Barma (2012) applies a more disaggregated set of criteria
to assess the relationship between petroleum sector gov-
ernance and institutional fragility in in Cambodia and
Timor-Leste.
3. Adapted from Barma et al. (2012).












ProducƟve rent generaƟon; rents




Rent generaƟon relaƟvely low; rent
distribuƟon benets client networks
Pluralist renƟer state
Rent generaƟon and distribuƟon
sustainably provide collecƟve goods
and services
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or one-party regime provides a relatively
peaceful order and some degree of public
goods for society. Regime stability and
greater institutionalisation lengthen time hori-
zons and enable more credible intertemporal
commitment. Thus in hegemonic rentier
states, natural resource rents can be generated
productively on the basis of credible extrac-
tive bargains; rents, however, are distributed
in a concentrated fashion among the domi-
nant elite. In pluralist settings, political elites
compete in elections on the basis of program-
matic commitments to collective welfare
enhancement, with an emphasis on society-
wide public goods provision. A higher degree
of institutionalisation and democratic mecha-
nisms of accountability together extend time
horizons and facilitate stable and well-
protected property rights. In turn, in pluralist
rentier states, rent generation and rent distri-
bution approach the provision of sustainable
public benefit.
4. The Rentier State at Work: Four Cases
from East Asia and the Pacific
Four resource-dependent developing countries
in East Asia—Laos and Mongolia with abun-
dant mineral reserves, Timor-Leste, one of the
most petroleum-dependent countries in the
world and Papua New Guinea, rich in both
minerals and petroleum—illustrate the four
quadrants of the typology and offer the oppor-
tunity to test the framework’s merits in
explaining variation in rentier state experi-
ences of the resource curse.4 In the spirit of
building causal generalisations about the
rentier effect, I examine both petroleum and
mineral cases.5 Based on each country’s con-
temporary political context, I outline the
expectations motivated by the typology and
then develop, on the basis of field and desk
research, a brief causal narrative to explain the
empirical evidence on rent generation and dis-
tribution patterns.
4.1 Papua New Guinea
The political–economic environment in Papua
New Guinea can be characterised as one of
patrimonialism. Despite the fact that Papua
New Guinea had from 1975–2011 an unbroken
run of democratic elections and transitions,
observers highlight its high levels of political
instability, with many having marked it as a
state on the verge of collapse (May 2003). In
particular, the short time horizons bred of this
instability and the winner-takes-all character-
istics of the political system mean that
intertemporal credibility is weak. A defining
feature of Papua New Guinean politics is the
manner in which electoral rules have led to a
fragmented party system, even after attempts
to remedy these outcomes (Reilly 2006)—with
hundreds of individuals competing in elections
and winners taking office with very low vote
shares on the basis of often highly local clan-
based ties. This extreme fragmentation has led
to low levels of overall political inclusiveness,
limiting elite incentives to provide public
goods and policies oriented toward collective
welfare (Fukuyama 2008, unpublished draft;
Allen & Hasnain 2010). A low degree of politi-
cal inclusiveness combined with weak
intertemporal credibility leads us to expect
poor performance on both rent generation and
distribution.
Papua New Guinea is mineral-rich, with
four major mines—the Boungainville and Ok
Tedi copper mines, and the Porgera and Lihir
gold mines—having operated over the past
four decades. It is also on the cusp of a major
new liquefied natural gas (LNG) project
coming on-stream, with the $15 billion PNG
LNG project in the Southern Highlands
slated to become the country’s largest ever
4. This comparative case application of the theoretical
framework enables both a deeper understanding of causal
complexity in how countries experience the resource curse
as well as a serving as a building block to broader theo-
retical generalisation on the matter (George & Bennett
2005).
5. Rentier state effects may well differ for these two types
of natural resource. Scholars have noted that the resource
curse is particularly acute in the case of petroleum (com-
pared to other natural resources such as hard-rock miner-
als) because of its ‘point source’ nature with highly
concentrated ownership and, consequently, weaker
accountability of political elites and potentially poorer
policy decisions.
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natural resource project. Papua New Guinea is
extremely resource-dependent and has experi-
enced a high degree of volatility in resource
revenues over the past three decades (Batten
2011; World Bank 2010a). The Bougainville
copper mine was generating 15 per cent of
government revenues in 1989 when it was shut
down halfway through its projected 30-year
lifespan because of the separatist conflict pro-
voked by grievances over rights to mineral
rents.6 With new mining operations initiated in
the early 1990s and the high copper and gold
prices of the mid-2000s, the share of mineral
revenues in total fiscal receipts varied between
20 and 40 per cent (Batten 2011). PNG LNG
revenues are projected to add an additional 20
per cent to government receipts over the next
10 years, climbing to over 30 per cent from
2024 onwards (IMF 2012b).
Rent generation in Papua New Guinea is
enhanced by the legal and regulatory frame-
work developed for the minerals sector. Banks
(2008) points out that the state plays a central
role in regulating the access of international
extractive producers to natural resources and
implementing the fiscal regime, but also
highlights the difficulties in managing rent
generation channels in practice as a result of
relatively few government staff and weak
capacity, particularly in the remote areas in
which mines are physically located. Rent
generation is complicated by the fact that,
although the government holds natural
resource rights, 97 per cent of land in Papua
New Guinea is under customary tenure, which
means that extractive projects require local
community consent. In addition, and perhaps
most significantly, rent generation in Papua
New Guinea has been compromised by its
experience with resource-related conflict. The
Bougainville conflict and mine closure have
received the most scholarly attention but other
simmering issues have also had an impact. For
example, a state of emergency was declared in
the Southern Highlands province in 2006 in an
attempt by the government to maintain stabil-
ity and investor confidence but, paradoxically,
the action weakened the government’s cred-
ibility. In 2012, the mining consulting
company Behre Dolbear rated Papua New
Guinea as among the five worst countries for
investor risk in the minerals sector on the basis
of its resource conflicts.
Other governmental actions have con-
strained the degree of intertemporal credibility
in Papua New Guinea regarding secure natural
resource property rights. In late 2013, the gov-
ernment nationalised the Ok Tedi mine, by far
the country’s largest mine and largest con-
tributor to government revenue. Acting to end
a long-standing dispute with the Sustainable
Development Program, which controlled the
majority stake on behalf of the local commu-
nity, the government took a 100 per cent own-
ership share of the mine, reneged on a previous
immunity deal granted to the major mine
operator for environmental damages, and took
control over the Sustainable Development
Program itself (Howes 2013). Expropriation of
any particular property severely compromises
the security of all property rights and, hence,
government credibility in terms of extractive
bargains with developers. Howes (2013) thus
observes, ‘what PNG has just shown is that it is
willing to renege on contracts and change its
mind on long-term endeavours within the
space of a decade.’
The Papua New Guinean government has not
been blind to the dynamics of the resource
curse. It acted as early as 1974 to ensure some
measure of fiscal smoothing and prudent spend-
ing of natural resource rents by putting in place
the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund
(MRSF). Yet, over time, good rent distribution
practices associated with the MRSF began to
unravel. Officials managing the MRSF found it
increasingly difficult to resist political pressure
for withdrawals larger than established limits;
and the MRSF was not well-linked with the
overall fiscal and budgetary framework
(World Bank 2010a). The MRSF was closed in
2001 after the government concluded it was
unsuccessful in smoothing spending or limiting
its politicisation. More encouragingly, a new
resource-backed sovereign wealth fund was
6. Much has been written about the separatist conflict
around the Bougainville mine in the late 1980s, a topic
beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Banks (2008) for
an summary of core debates on the issue.
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established in 2011. It emphasises expenditure
smoothing over time with a rule that annual
appropriations cannot exceed the previous
15-year average of revenues from mining and
petroleum. It also aims to depoliticise invest-
ment spending and make it more efficient with
the proposed earmarking of some portion of the
fund for infrastructure investments. The key to
the fund’s success over time will be the cred-
ibility of political commitment to sound
revenue management.
Papua New Guinea performs rather poorly
on other aspects of rent distribution—local
communities are not benefitting in the manner
they have been promised; nor are society-wide
collective goods being adequately provided
through the public investment plan. Govern-
ment investment in social services is low and
public sector capacity to prioritise and imple-
ment public spending is weak (World Bank
2010a). Batten’s (2011) analysis of the uses of
resource rents in Papua New Guinea indicates
that only 2.5 per cent of these revenues have
been spent on health and education and only 5
per cent on infrastructure investments, with the
rest going to general government operations.
Similarly, Johnson’s (2012) study of the distri-
bution of benefits from the Porgera gold mine
demonstrates that although the mine operator
was making the necessary payments to local
government, the promised service provision
and investments in the local community were
not occurring.
Public expenditure in Papua New Guinea is
not only inefficient, it is also highly politicised
as a result of political instability and fragmen-
tation. Allen and Hasnain (2010) point to the
established literature on the role of patronage
in the country’s political system, although they
find that there is spatial and regional variation
in the extent to which local-level development
funds are used for patronage. The introduction
of limited preferential voting as an electoral
reform in 2007 was intended to broaden politi-
cal constituencies and hence reduce political
fragmentation and reorient political incentives
towards more collectivist objectives. The
recent 2013–2017 Medium Term Fiscal Strat-
egy is intended to set the fiscal rules against
which the country’s public investment needs in
the social sectors and physical infrastructure
will be balanced. Thus, reforms have been
introduced to remedy the outcomes identified
here but they have yet to change the country’s
poor rent distribution practices.
Overall, as expected, Papua New Guinea
appears to be performing quite poorly on rent
generation and distribution with a view to
sustainable development outcomes. The
country has vividly experienced the boom
and bust cycle that often exacerbates the
worst elements of the resource curse. Papua
New Guinea appears to avoid the most egre-
gious forms of outright elite theft of the
country’s natural resources. Yet weak
intertemporal credibility—a result of political
instability and fragmentation, conflict and
policy decisions such as the Ok Tedi expro-
priation—have limited its ability to generate
resource rents optimally. A low degree of
political inclusiveness, in the context of
highly local patronage-oriented political–
economic incentives, has also led to rent
distribution practices that fail to deliver col-
lective social benefits to the population.
Together, weak intertemporal credibility and
a low degree of political inclusiveness have
contributed to the emergence of an acute
form of the resource curse in Papua New
Guinea.
4.2 Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste’s political economy can be
characterised as one of clientelism. Time hori-
zons are short because of political instability
and repeated episodes of post-independence
violence, making intertemporal credibility
relatively weak. Political inclusiveness, on the
other hand, is higher—with broad-based
political parties competing at the ballot within
an electoral framework. Yet political parties
have increasingly run campaigns geared
towards gathering clientelist rather than broad-
based support and political power has become
increasingly concentrated in the executive,
with little restraint from institutional checks
and balances. A low degree of intertemporal
credibility combined with a higher, yet possi-
bly declining, degree of political inclusiveness
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would lead us to expect poor performance in
rent generation along with better, albeit
perhaps weakening, performance in terms of
rent distribution.
Timor-Leste is one of the most petroleum
revenue–dependent countries in the world: its
petroleum and natural gas revenues provided
about 95 per cent of government revenues and
constituted about 70 per cent of GDP in 2012
(IMF 2012a). Petroleum production began in
2004 at the Bayu-Undan gas field, located in
the offshore Joint Petroleum Development
Area shared with Australia. Timor-Leste’s
portion of the future revenue stream from
Bayu-Undan is estimated at US$15.2 billion in
present value terms, in comparison with the
government’s overall budget of about US$1.8
billion in 2012 (Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste 2013a).
Partly due to the extensive international
state-building effort there, the Timorese gov-
ernment decided upon petroleum sector insti-
tutions and policies explicitly intended to
mitigate the resource curse.7 Over time,
however, good practice in the management
of petroleum rents has begun to unravel.
Timor-Leste has, for example, employed best-
practice, transparent criteria in all exploration
contract bidding rounds to date. Yet currently,
through its new national oil company Timor
Gas & Petroleum (TimorGAP), the govern-
ment is engaging with regional state-owned oil
companies and consortia to develop a massive
infrastructure investment known as the Tasi
Mane Project, or South Coast Petroleum Infra-
structure Project. This ambitious project
includes the construction of an LNG plant and
establishment of a supply base, storage and
port facilities on the south coast of the country.
Observers agree that a number of secret
memoranda of understanding for exploration
contracts may have already been signed in
exchange for proposed investment partner-
ships.8 Exclusive deals on petroleum extrac-
tion sites that are expected to have high rent
potential would weaken the country’s hitherto
exemplary rent generation practices.
The centrepiece of Timor-Leste’s institu-
tional architecture in the petroleum sector is its
Petroleum Fund, to which all petroleum rev-
enues are directed, without exception. The
Petroleum Fund Law establishes the concept of
Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI), a prin-
ciple intended to ensure intergenerational
saving of the country’s windfall income stream.
ESI is defined as the maximum amount that can
be appropriated from the fund in any fiscal year,
such that enough revenues are left in the fund
for the same value to be appropriated in all
future years. The law sets ESI at 3 per cent, on
the basis of conservative projections of revenue
from proven reserves only and the estimate that
the fund will generate at least a 3 per cent return
on investment. ESI in 2012 was US$665
million, compared with the total government
budget of US$1.8 billion. In turn, all revenue
appropriated from the fund must be integrated
fiscally with the formal budget process, thereby
ensuring parliamentary oversight.
The government is enabled, however,
through the Petroleum Fund Law, to exceed
ESI in requesting budget appropriations as
long as it provides justification to parliament.
The new governing coalition that came to
power in 2007 after a period of political insta-
bility and civil conflict began a practice of
exceeding ESI to finance its stated goal of
‘buying the peace’ through expanded govern-
ment spending. Government appropriations
have since climbed over ESI every year from
2008 onwards, thus weakening the steward-
ship of petroleum rents. In 2012, the additional
withdrawal to finance the government’s budget
was US$829 million over the ESI allocation
of US$665 million (Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste 2013a). At current spending rates,
the watchdog organisation La’o Hamutuk esti-
mates that the Petroleum Fund—intended to
7. The discussion on institutional and governance
arrangements in Timor-Leste’s petroleum sector draws
from a World Bank-sponsored research trip to Timor-Leste
in November 2009 (Anderson et al. 2010, unpublished
draft; Barma 2012), and a research trip to Timor-Leste in
February 2013 made possible by funding from the
Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian
National University.
8. Author’s interviews with government officials and
donor and civil society representatives, Dili, East Timor,
November 2009 and February 2013.
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guarantee a permanent stream of petroleum
rent into the future—will be depleted by 2028.
In addition, the Petroleum Fund Law was
amended in 2011 in three ways that have made
it easier and more legitimate for the govern-
ment to spend higher shares of the country’s
petroleum rents: enabling the government to
make less conservative investments with
higher potential returns, making it possible for
the government to borrow up to 10 per cent of
the fund’s holdings against the fund and dilut-
ing the burden of justification required for
exceeding ESI.
Rent distribution practices have also weak-
ened because the coalition government that
came to power in 2007 acted quickly to reverse
the austerity measures introduced by the coun-
try’s first independent government. Frustrated
by the complex and centralised design of the
formal public financial management system,
the government opened up two key spending
channels so that by mid-2008, it was spending
seven to eight times more each month than the
year before (Anderson et al. 2010, unpub-
lished draft). First, it increased consumption
spending by instituting a series of cash trans-
fers to veterans, senior citizens and vulnerable
households. These cash transfers constitute a
very large share of the budget: US$234 million
or 13 per cent of the 2012 budget, compared
with the US$153 million spent on health
and education (Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste 2013b). The second spending
channel was an increase in public investment
through both decentralised and shortcut
procurement procedures, which circumvent
regular spending and procurement controls. In
October 2009, for example, an executive
decree channelled US$70 million of an
unutilised capital investment allocation into
what became known as the ‘Package Referen-
dum,’ a fund for small- to medium-size invest-
ments in sectors such as roads and irrigation.
These resources were allocated entirely off
budget, by a recently formed business associa-
tion not subject to any accountability controls,
thus heightening the risks of favouritism in
rent distribution.
Both channels of spending appear to have
disproportionately benefitted veterans of the
country’s resistance movement, a core
network of support for the current coalition.9 A
preliminary analysis of geographic allocation
indicated that the government appeared to be
spending more—in terms of both cash trans-
fers and public investments—in the districts
most strongly supportive of the coalition part-
ners in the 2007 election (Anderson et al.
2010, unpublished draft). In the aggregate,
US$85 million of the cash transfers, or 5 per
cent of the total budget, went to veterans pay-
ments. Veterans have also been the explicit
beneficiaries of the government’s decentral-
ised public investment efforts, through, for
example, contracts for electricity grid connec-
tions as the public utility has rolled out nation-
wide access over the past three years. The
coalition won re-election in 2012.
Along with constituency-targeted public
spending patterns, increasing elite capture of
major rent streams is another sign that rent
distribution performance is weakening as
expected. Reports abound of rent seeking
around the bigger ticket items on the govern-
ment’s public investment program and recur-
rent contracts through the use of sole-source
contracts that contravene the procurement
law.10 This channel of rent distribution benefits
only a small and concentrated political–
economic elite comprising the family
members and business partners, both Timorese
and foreign, of senior government officials.
Overall, Timor-Leste offers mixed support
for the typological framework advanced here.
Rent generation practices have been better
than expected, built upon model contracts and
the Petroleum Fund architecture. Yet good per-
formance in this arena seems to be unravelling
with emerging moves towards more secretive
contract negotiations and through the intro-
duction of TimorGAP, which could, like
other influential national oil companies in
developing countries, divert transparency and
9. Author’s interviews with government officials and
donor and civil society representatives, Dili, East Timor,
February 2013.
10. Author’s interviews with donor and civil society rep-
resentatives, Dili, East Timor, February 2013. A 2012
Deloitte audit of procurement in Timor-Leste revealed a
number of irregularities and sources of leakage.
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accountability in contracting processes and
take a substantial portion of resource rents off
budget. Rent distribution has also been within
the realm of what we would expect. To be
sure, resource rents have been spent through
the budget on public goods. Yet, for the most
part—as one might expect in clientelist
systems, where political support tends to rely
on distribution of patronage—the bulk of
expenditures has been on consumption goods
(i.e., direct transfers, subsidies and public
sector employment), with less investment in
public infrastructure and other avenues of
longer-term collective welfare. Now, further-
more, public investment execution seems to be
enriching elites to a greater degree than
before, which is also in line with the expecta-
tion of particularist rent distribution associated
with clientelist rentier states.
4.3 Laos
The Lao political economy fits within the
hegemonic type in the framework advanced
here. Time horizons are lengthened by the
relative stability afforded by one-party,
institutionalised rule, although a lack of inves-
tor confidence in the rule of law weakens
intertemporal credibility somewhat. By con-
trast, the one-party system, with the state still
heavily involved in economic activity, makes
political inclusiveness low; an assessment
reinforced by the continued dominance of a
few powerful provincial political networks
embedded in positions of power within the Lao
People’s Revolutionary Party. This combina-
tion leads us to expect mixed performance on
rent generation, along with weak performance
on rent distribution.
Laos has recently discovered promising
mineral reserves for commercial production,
prompting a dramatic start-up in industrial
mining in the country over the past decade.11
The value of mineral production rose from
about US$8 million in 2002 to over US$600
million in 2007 and 2008, driven by two mid-
size copper and gold sites, Sepon and Phu Bia.
Total government revenues from taxes and fees
in the mining sector exceeded $120 million in
2007 and $90 million in 2008, adding over 20
per cent to fiscal receipts (World Bank 2010b).
The World Bank has estimated that mineral
wealth makes up almost one-fifth of total Lao
wealth and that the mineral and hydropower
sectors will together add over 4 per cent to
GDP annually over the next two decades.
Laos has been moderately successful at gen-
erating natural resource rents, albeit with some
mixed-quality policies and processes in place.
The legal framework governing the mining
sector has been relatively unstable over the
past decade, with both the Minerals Law and
the details of the fiscal regime subject to a
great deal of flux. For example, during consul-
tations on the revision of the Minerals Law in
2008, development and industry partners
advocated a standardised fiscal regime but this
provision was not included in the final draft
law submitted to the National Assembly.
Opaque and overlapping institutional man-
dates for natural resource management across
government agencies and levels of government
have negatively affected the ability of the Lao
government to generate resource rents.12 In
practice, on the other hand, many mineral
concessions—certainly those of any major
economic significance—are decided at higher
political levels, with very senior officials
making decisions on the basis of strategic con-
siderations. This high-level political involve-
ment in contract negotiations has meant that a
number of investors have felt secure, on the
basis of their confidence in the regime’s sta-
bility and overall developmental orientation, in
making long-term extraction deals with the
state and investing in the sector, boding well
for revenue generation.
Administrative corruption around contract
awards and revenue collection appear to be
quite limited. Yet the opacity around the con-
tracting process enables some degree of elite
capture of corporate payoffs, diminishing
revenue streams to the government. The Lao
11. Laos also has tremendous hydropower potential from
abundant water resources, which I do not deal with here.
12. The discussion on mineral sector governance in Laos
draws from two World Bank-sponsored research trips to
Vientiane in 2009, as well as Barma et al. (2010).
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military owns large tracts of land in the
country and there is no record of the mineral
contracts that are negotiated on these lands,
nor resulting revenue streams, which almost
certainly do not enter the state’s coffers. Rent
generation, more broadly, is likely further
diminished by the fact that the government has
almost no independent capacity to assess
mineral quantity or grade and relies entirely on
extractive company-provided information to
determine royalty and tax payments.
Turning to rent distribution, public invest-
ment planning and prioritisation is quite weak
in Laos, even in the context of the 5-year plan-
ning system. This is due not only to the coun-
try’s low institutional capacity, but also to the
fact that the ultimate decision-making power
over the bulk of investment projects still rests
with provincial governors instead of the Min-
istry of Planning and Investment. It appears, de
facto, that projects can still be initiated by pro-
vincial governors even if no budget appropria-
tion has been made available and, generally,
the execution of projects is the responsibility
of provincial governments or of sector minis-
tries, with few supervisory or audit functions
being played by central ministries. Attempts at
developing a modern procurement system
have yet to gain traction. To be sure, available
evidence suggests that project execution in at
least some sectors works well, with projects
being undertaken and finished at reasonable
cost such that some portion of rents is indeed
translated into public goods. But weak pro-
curement controls have led to a group of rising
new contractors with family and business
connections to senior officials benefitting dis-
proportionately from resource-backed public
investment. In this respect, the resource sector
mirrors the economy more broadly, where the
marketisation reforms introduced in 1986 have
cemented the concentrated and inter-locking
political–economic dominance of the powerful
Lao clans that dominate the Party and govern-
ment decision-making (Stuart-Fox 2004;
Soukamneuth 2006).
Available evidence from Laos appears to
support, for the most part, the typological
framework in this article. The relatively longer
time horizons and stability afforded by the
one-party regime appear to have strengthened
intertemporal credibility and enabled the gov-
ernment to continue striking resource extrac-
tion deals with investors in an otherwise
challenging business climate, hence building
the potential for rent generation. Yet revenue
collection is hampered on two fronts: first, in
terms of the rents siphoned off by hegemonic
political and military elites—a problem asso-
ciated with political inclusiveness; and second,
in terms of the rents foregone due to weak
institutional capacity for monitoring and col-
lecting royalties and taxes. Rent distribution in
Laos is more oriented towards the collective
good than one might initially expect and this
may be, in part, due to the strong socialist
legacy and the regime’s developmental
orientation, further enabled by the system’s
longer time horizons. Nevertheless, clear
patterns of elite-oriented rent distribution
are emerging in both public investment
prioritisation and procurement processes.
4.4 Mongolia
Of the four countries considered in this
article, Mongolia comes closest to approxi-
mating a programmatic pluralist system, with
lengthier time horizons and a higher degree
of political inclusiveness due to its successful
political and economic liberalisation over the
past two decades. This combination of greater
intertemporal credibility and more collec-
tively oriented politics leads us to expect that
Mongolia would perform better than the other
countries considered here in terms of both
rent generation and rent distribution.
As part of its economic liberalisation
package, Mongolia enacted a new minerals
law in 1997 that was considered extremely
attractive to investors and thought to embed
many good mineral management practices,
including especially a commitment to the first-
come, first-served principle for granting
mineral rights (Ortega Girones et al. 2009).
But the framework governing the sector was
altered in 2006, with the adoption of a Wind-
fall Profits Tax and amendments to the miner-
als law that compromised the security of
mineral rights tenure and introduced new risks
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for license holders. The amendments also des-
ignated a category of ‘strategic deposits’ in
which the government had the right to take a
50 per cent equity share in extraction, marking
the beginning of a prolonged and energetic
public debate about what constituted the gov-
ernment’s and, by extension, citizens’ fair
share in the country’s mineral wealth. Rent
generation potential and commercial activity
in the sector were directly affected by these
changes to the legal framework: the enactment
of the 1997 law marked a take-off for the
sector, while the 2006 amendment, in turn, had
a negative impact on the sector, bringing a
marked decline in licensing activity and rev-
enues. Mongolia witnessed the consequences
of this period of investor uncertainty on the
predictability of mineral sector policy: activity
on the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold project, the
second largest mine in the world, was halted as
a result of the debate on equity share, thus the
country was not positioned to take full fiscal
advantage of the mid-2000s boom in copper
prices. The ongoing debate between ‘resource
nationalists’ and those who would return to
more favourable terms for extractive industry
investors continues to animate political com-
petition into today, as well as limit Mongolia’s
rent generation potential due to the uncertainty
in extractive terms (Boulegue 2013).
The mining license system in Mongolia has
also contributed to a wariness on the part of
investors to make extractive commitments.13
The system is operated manually, with mul-
tiple points subject to administrative corrup-
tion and political interference and the general
perception is that favouritism and conflicts of
interest in license allocation are major prob-
lems (Reeves 2011). The 2006 World Bank
Investment Climate Survey estimated unoffi-
cial payments for exploration and mining
licenses at 40 per cent of official fees. In addi-
tion, civil society groups articulated the view
that subnational officials simply engage in
contract negotiations with investors them-
selves, taking side payments from mining
companies in return for their approval.14
Even though rent generation performance
could have been enhanced considerably, the
fact that mineral discoveries were proliferat-
ing at the time of commodity price highs
meant that Mongolia enjoyed a resource rent
windfall in the mid-2000s. The government
distributed these rents to the population
through two major channels—public invest-
ments and social transfers. Mongolia’s public
investment program expanded ninefold from
2005 to 2008, but the country’s public invest-
ment processes were simply not equipped to
handle this volume of resources. There is no
institutionalised, comprehensive prioritisation
process; investment planning is, instead,
highly politicised. The political rules were
rewritten in the mid-2000s to explicitly grant
members of parliament discretion over a sig-
nificant portion of public monies in their
electoral districts. Hasnain (2011) argues that
Mongolian parliamentarians have the incen-
tives to commit public investment funds to
smaller projects that benefit particular geo-
graphic localities and political supporters,
instead of to public infrastructure projects
that would enhance collective welfare across
the country. Furthermore, until 2010, fiscal
rules permitted parliament to increase the
budget proposed by the executive, leading to
a major source of fiscal instability and
overcommitment of public funds that contrib-
uted to a fiscal crisis in 2009 and 2010.
In addition to public investment growth, the
Mongolian government introduced in 2005
what it termed the Child Money Program as a
mechanism for transferring resource rents to
its citizens. This and other social transfers
were promised in 2004 political party plat-
forms at the height of the commodity boom.
Although direct distribution to citizens is cer-
tainly with its merits, there has been limited
uptake of such schemes in developing coun-
tries because they are difficult to implement.
The universalisation of the Child Money
Program in Mongolia, to avoid the administra-
13. The discussion on Mongolia’s mineral sector gover-
nance draws from two World Bank-sponsored research
trips to Ulaan Baatar in 2008, as well as Boyreau et al.
(2009, unpublished draft).
14. Author’s interviews with Mongolian civil society rep-
resentatives; Ulaan Baatar, Mongolia, February 2008.
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tive complexities of targeting, also contributed
to the later fiscal crisis.
Mongolia’s experiences in rent generation
and distribution provide mixed evidence with
regard to the typological framework advanced
here. The relatively longer time horizons and
stability afforded by orderly democratic tran-
sitions have been dampened by constant tin-
kering with electoral and institutional rules
and the legal and regulatory framework for the
minerals sector. Even under those conditions,
however, Mongolia was able to generate a sig-
nificant stream of rents during the commodity
boom of the mid-2000s and successive Mon-
golian governments have managed to distrib-
ute resource wealth to the population through
the public investment and social transfer pro-
grams. Yet the possible benefits of the higher
degree of political inclusiveness overall have
been attenuated in the minerals sector—there
is clear evidence that political interference and
clientelism contributed to rent seeking, elite
enrichment and particularist public goods
provision. Mongolia illustrates the particular
dependence of rentier state outcomes on vola-
tile commodity prices—when resource rent
streams were high, rent generation and rent
distribution performed as expected; but when
the boom turned to bust, performance in the
two rent arenas deteriorated rapidly.
5. Conclusion
The brief evidence presented here on the
distinct patterns of resource rent generation
and distribution in Laos, Mongolia, Papua
New Guinea and Timor-Leste supports the
expectations motivated by the typology. In
resource-dependent developing countries with
weak intertemporal credibility and low politi-
cal inclusiveness, elites are able to channel
resource rents to benefit themselves and their
clientelist networks and away from invest-
ment in broad-based public goods and social
welfare. Factors that lengthen time horizons
enhance the potential for favourable extrac-
tive deals and hence rent generation for
society; and improving dimensions of politi-
cal inclusiveness makes it more likely that
rents will be distributed to enhance collective
welfare.15
Rentier state experiences vary in important
ways—and countries will be better able to
mitigate the resource curse if we can better
identify and understand their particular expe-
rience of it. In countries with short time hori-
zons borne of political instability and a lack of
commitment to extractive bargains and secure
property rights, policies and arrangements that
enhance intertemporal credibility in the natural
resource sector could alleviate the problems
associated with generating resource rents. For
example, a simple, rule-based and transparent
process for granting resource concessions
would help to minimise uncertainty and
improve predictability, in turn enabling a
country to better reap its natural resource
wealth. Timor-Leste’s rent generation has
indeed been enhanced in this manner through
the use of model contracts and exemplary
bidding practices. In countries with low
degrees of political inclusiveness where elites
do not have the incentives to make decisions
oriented toward broad-based collective
welfare, mobilising collective action could
improve rent distribution practices. For
example, earmarking a portion of resource
rents for social sector and public investment
spending or community-based budget over-
sight or participation at some level of the
public investment process could help to ensure
that at least some portion of resource rents are
spent on the public good. Participatory budget-
ing with civil society organizations in Mongo-
lia, social transfer schemes in Mongolia and
Timor-Leste, and decentralised public invest-
ment implementation in Laos have, to some
extent, helped focus rent distribution more on
the collective good.
Although natural resource dependence
brings with it certain structural effects, the
resource curse is not a deterministic outcome.
Even in Papua New Guinea, where short time
horizons and low political inclusiveness appear
to make certain elements of the resource curse
15. See Barma et al. (2012) for a detailed treatment of
specific potential reform interventions along the natural
resource value chain.
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over-determined, decision-makers have the
ability to implement policies that can mitigate
the worst of the resource curse. Sound resource
rent management through stabilisation fund-
based mechanisms that ensure expenditure
smoothing, along with earmarking of revenues
for public goods may yet improve outcomes
in Papua New Guinea, with its major new
resource stream offering a window of opportu-
nity. The principles of simplicity, predictability,
transparency and accountability in resource
rent management carry across all rentier states
that wish to avoid the resource curse—but
finding the best way to achieve these goals in
the resource sector depends upon a more finely
grained apprehension of a country’s particular
rentier state experience.
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